Increasingly Connected but Contested: Central Asia’s Rival Networks
Connectivity in Central Asia is no longer about bridges, railways, or ports alone; it is about power and influence—who shapes the routes, who defines the rules, and who determines the region’s strategic choices. Landlocked yet indispensable, resource-rich yet infrastructure-poor, Central Asia has emerged as a key testing ground for competing connectivity models—Chinese, Russian, European Union, and American, increasingly Indian, alongside less dominant alternatives and locally driven approaches.
China’s Asset-Driven Connectivity
China’s model in Central Asia is asset-heavy and front-loaded. Connectivity is advanced through digital and physical infrastructure, logistics hubs, pipelines, railways, and now fibre-optic corridors. Political influence flows from financing, ownership and technical standards, rather than formal alliances. Over time, such connectivity generates structural dependence, as these assets are difficult to unwind or replace. While there are documented megaprojects that deliver mutual benefits, the long-term advantages tend to accrue to China.
Connectivity is advanced through digital and physical infrastructure, logistics hubs, pipelines, railways, and now fibre-optic corridors.
This asymmetry is reinforced by the accumulation of debt from Chinese loans that Central Asian states are unlikely to repay for decades. This dynamic does not concern Chinese investors, who anticipate future opportunities to bid for critical mineral projects, especially under new phases of geopolitical exploration. Their prior involvement in several mining projects, as well as the construction of production and processing facilities locally, positions them strategically to secure contracts.
War in Ukraine and the Rewiring of Eurasian Connectivity
Central Asia’s renewed importance is inseparable from the war in Ukraine. The conflict did more than disrupt Europe’s security order; it exposed the fragility of Eurasian connectivity built around Russia and forced states to diversify. Moscow still frames Central Asia as a strategic buffer and an economic space anchored in legacy infrastructure and institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union.
Russia emphasises “soft connectivity”, such as customs harmonisation, common regulations, and an integrated market space, complemented by corridor planning. Rather than building entirely new routes, it seeks to bind Central Asia into a Russia-centred economic system through institutional lock-in rather than physical dominance. Yet sanctions and transit disruptions have undermined Russia’s credibility as a reliable hub, weakening its leverage and opening space for competition. Within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the contrast has become increasingly stark: China delivers capital, speed, and scalable infrastructure, while Russia relies on historical depth and security ties. The resulting imbalance is evident, and Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) are not passive observers. They are acutely aware of the asymmetry and are recalibrating their options accordingly.
Agency in an Age of Competing Corridors
Beyond Russia and China, Central Asian states are diversifying their connectivity through selective, deal-based partnerships rather than bloc alignment, and the US approach under C5+1 is emblematic of this logic. Washington prioritises transactions over visions: securing access to rare earths and other critical minerals, supporting alternative trade routes that bypass Russia, and encouraging regional coordination that serves these goals. Under C5+1, this has translated into targeted cooperation on critical minerals supply chains, US backing for the Middle Corridor through trade facilitation and customs harmonisation rather than infrastructure finance, and security cooperation framed around resilience rather than alliance-building. Connectivity is, therefore, instrumental rather than developmental, used to lock in practical bargains, reduce dependence on Moscow and Beijing, and extract strategic value without the long-term costs of corridor leadership or megaproject delivery.
Washington prioritises transactions over visions: securing access to rare earths and other critical minerals, supporting alternative trade routes that bypass Russia, and encouraging regional coordination that serves these goals.
India’s approach to Central Asia and connectivity shares important normative affinities with the European Union’s Global Gateway, particularly in its emphasis on standards, sustainability, and respect for sovereignty, yet it remains distinct in its strategic orientation and geographic priorities. Like the EU, India frames connectivity not as a vehicle for dominance through scale, but as a means of enhancing resilience, diversification, and strategic autonomy. Through initiatives such as the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the development of Chabahar Port, India seeks access to Central Asia, Russia, and Europe via multimodal routes that bypass geopolitical chokepoints and avoid binding political conditionalities. At the same time, New Delhi explicitly embeds connectivity within a normative discourse centred on sovereignty, transparency, financial sustainability, and local ownership-principles repeatedly affirmed in joint statements with Central Asian partners and official policy articulations.
This positioning aligns closely with the EU’s standards-driven connectivity model, which prioritises regulatory convergence, corridor efficiency, and resilience over megaprojects, as seen in its support for routes such as the Trans-Caspian that aim to reduce over-dependence on Russia and China. However, EU connectivity is explicitly conditional and selectively shapes alignment through financial criteria, rules, and regulatory standards. India’s model is less prescriptive and more strategically flexible, presenting itself as a normative yet non-coercive alternative within Eurasia’s increasingly contested connectivity landscape.
Meanwhile, actors such as Türkiye, Japan, and South Korea operate in more targeted ways: Türkiye promotes corridor governance and political coordination through the Middle Corridor; Japan focuses on high-quality infrastructure, human capital, and rule-aligned financing; and South Korea links connectivity to industrial policy, supply chains, and critical minerals. Taken together, these engagements do not replace Russian or Chinese influence, but they do give Central Asian states greater room to manoeuvre, allowing them to localise projects, hedge dependencies, and shape connectivity outcomes sector by sector rather than submit to a single dominant model.
Central Asia’s Home-Grown Connectivity and What Comes Next
Alongside these major external connectivity models, the Central Asian states have pursued localised, enabling initiatives that prioritise functionality over visibility. Programs such as CAREC focus on corridor performance, border procedures, customs harmonisation, and digital trade facilitation, translating external investments into usable trade flows rather than substituting for them. Since 2001, CAREC has mobilised roughly US$51 billion across more than 270 regional projects, with nearly two-thirds directed to transport, largely for upgrading existing infrastructure and institutions rather than creating new flagship routes. These measures deliver concrete benefits by reducing transit times, lowering logistics costs, and improving interoperability across east–west and north–south corridors. The contrast is clearest when compared with China’s BRI megaprojects, which often bundle financing, construction, and operational control within a single external actor; by comparison, Central Asia’s localised initiatives emphasise national ownership, incremental gains, and regulatory coordination, anchoring diverse foreign connectivity models in domestic institutions and limiting long-term structural dependence.
Since 2001, CAREC has mobilised roughly US$51 billion across more than 270 regional projects, with nearly two-thirds directed to transport, largely for upgrading existing infrastructure and institutions rather than creating new flagship routes.
While Central Asian states have developed indigenous connectivity platforms, their limited scale and leverage mean future outcomes will continue to be shaped through selective external partnerships. For now, the most favourable scenario is managed multipolarity, in which overlapping corridors persist, and regional states continue to arbitrate between partners. However, this outcome is only doable if external powers resist the temptation to weaponise infrastructure. Looking ahead, any niche strategies will interact with larger models-China building assets, Russia systems, the EU rules, the US coalitions, and India principled access-ensuring that connectivity remains a forward-looking struggle over regional order rather than a simple debate about roads versus rails.
Alica Kizekova is the Course and Major Lead in International Relations and Security, and a Lecturer in the Faculty of Humanities at Curtin University, Western Australia