A fractured consensus: The uncertain future of climate governance after US withdrawal
The US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement signals a major test for global climate governance, raising concerns over multilateralism’s resilience and future.
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This article is part of the series—Raisina Edit 2025
The United States’ (US) decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement in 2025 represents a defining moment for international climate governance, testing the resilience of multilateral efforts to coordinate the global response to the climate crisis, raising broader questions—not only about the stability of global climate governance but about the capacity of the entire multilateral system to maintain continuity and effectiveness in an increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape. Washington’s disengagement is not an isolated event; instead, it signals a deeper crisis concerning the resilience of international institutions amid national political fluctuations and the growing competition between development models. The US retreat is not merely a setback in climate policy but an indication of the structural fragility of multilateral agreements, increasingly vulnerable to the instabilities of individual states and the redefinition of global spheres of influence.
The first withdrawal in 2017 had already exposed the structural weakness of a system built on voluntary commitments; today’s disengagement occurs in an even more precarious context—one where political, economic, and technological tensions converge with a reconfiguration of global power dynamics, further undermining the effectiveness of multilateralism. Unlike in 2017, however, the stakes are now higher: the global energy transition is accelerating, green industrial policies are reshaping economic priorities, and the absence of the US may have long-term ramifications for emissions targets and the credibility of the Paris Agreement.
The US retreat is not merely a setback in climate policy but an indication of the structural fragility of multilateral agreements, increasingly vulnerable to the instabilities of individual states and the redefinition of global spheres of influence.
The question is no longer who will assume climate leadership but whether the current governance framework can still shape global trajectories or is steadily losing its influence.
Between influence and constraint: China and the European Union in the post-Paris order
The US withdrawal inevitably reopens the debate on the distribution of global climate leadership and whether other major powers are equipped to fill the void left. China has firmly established itself as the dominant industrial force in the energy transition, holding a decisive lead in green technology production: it currently accounts for 41 percent of the world’s installed solar capacity and 55 percent of wind power, alongside control over the lithium-ion battery supply chain, with more than 70 percent of global production. Simultaneously, it has expanded its financial influence through strategic investments in emerging economies, infrastructure, and energy cooperation alliances.
However, while China is indispensable in reshaping the low-carbon economy, its climate strategy remains ambiguous: In 2023 alone, it approved new coal power projects totaling 100 Gigawatts (GW)—exceeding several advanced economies’ installed capacity. This apparent contradiction reveals a policy in which industrial supremacy in renewables functions primarily as a geopolitical lever rather than a driver for decarbonisation.
Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) maintains a leading role in climate regulation but struggles to translate its policy framework into an effective geopolitical instrument. The European Green Deal has introduced ambitious environmental standards, yet its implementation faces growing internal resistance and mounting international competition. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), designed to shield European industries from competition with countries enforcing weaker environmental regulations, has triggered trade frictions and raised questions about the EU’s ability to reconcile climate ambition with industrial competitiveness. Furthermore, the European political landscape—characterised by French instability, German uncertainty, and increasing polarisation across member states—undermines the EU’s credibility as a global climate leader.
The European Green Deal has introduced ambitious environmental standards, yet its implementation faces growing internal resistance and mounting international competition.
Thus, the dilemma is whether Europe can replace the US in climate leadership and sustain internal cohesion as the energy transition increasingly becomes a battleground for geopolitical competition.
A shifting balance of power: India, Brazil, and the emerging climate order
Beyond the traditional climate powers, the US disengagement may accelerate the emergence of other strategic players in the energy transition. India, currently the world’s third-largest carbon dioxide emitter, has set ambitious targets: by 2030, it aims to reach 500 GW of installed renewable capacity. However, coal remains its primary source of electricity generation, and a rapid transition could carry significant economic and social risks. Brazil, which will host the Conference of the Parties (COP) 30 in Belém in 2025, has achieved a 50 percent reduction in Amazon deforestation compared to 2022, signaling a shift from previous policies. Nevertheless, the ongoing tension between environmental conservation and agribusiness interests remains a factor that could impact the country’s ability to assume a leadership role in climate governance.
The absence of the US is not simply a transfer of leadership to other actors but a catalyst for a broader transformation of climate diplomacy. While emerging economies assume a more active role, their priorities are often shaped by immediate developmental and energy security needs rather than long-term decarbonisation strategies. The risk is that without a unified US presence in climate negotiations, divergences between industrialised and developing nations will deepen and delay global efforts to reach a consensus.
Fragmented ambitions: The multilateral system under pressure
In the short term, the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement will immediately affect the credibility of the financial mechanisms underpinning international climate architecture. At COP30 in Belém (10–21 November 2025), one of the most contentious issues will be defining a new financial target to support vulnerable countries. Without Washington’s contribution—already lagging behind previous commitments—the likelihood of securing a robust agreement diminishes significantly. According to COP30 President-designate André Aranha Corrêa do Lago, the exit will further complicate efforts to meet global climate finance targets, exacerbating tensions between advanced and developing economies.
Without Washington’s contribution—already lagging behind previous commitments—the likelihood of securing a robust agreement diminishes significantly.
Beyond the immediate diplomatic fallout, the broader risk lies in the gradual erosion of trust in multilateral mechanisms, with long-term consequences for global coordination in the energy transition. If climate governance fails to adapt to Washington’s absence, a shift from universal commitments toward fragmented regional coalitions could be observed, where economic and political interests shape climate ambition rather than shared global responsibility. The crisis of multilateral climate governance may lead to a fragmented system in which misaligned regional strategies increasingly replace global commitments. In the absence of a coherent governance framework, efforts to contain global warming risk being reduced to a patchwork of isolated initiatives, lacking the structural vision necessary to manage a challenge that is, by nature, transnational.
The crisis of governance: Climate and the future of the international order
The US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is not merely a setback for climate governance; it is a symptom of a more profound transformation—the crisis of multilateralism as a regulatory mechanism for global power dynamics. A treaty built on moral persuasion and voluntary nationally determined commitments (NDCs) is structurally vulnerable to national political fluctuations. Therefore, the fundamental question is not who will assume Washington’s leadership role but whether the Paris Agreement can withstand the pressures of an increasingly competitive and fragmented global system.
A treaty built on moral persuasion and voluntary nationally determined commitments (NDCs) is structurally vulnerable to national political fluctuations.
Suppose international institutions fail to reinforce their capacity to hold states accountable for their commitments. In that case, the risk extends far beyond delaying the energy transition—it threatens the legitimacy of the multilateral system itself, with ramifications that reach well beyond the environmental sphere and into the stability of the global order.
In this context, climate multilateralism becomes emblematic of a broader recalibration of global power relations. If international agreements remain subject to domestic political contingencies, regionalism and bilateral transactions will gain prominence, increasingly detached from a cohesive global framework. The result will not only be a fragmented system but a landscape in which the energy transition becomes a tool for geopolitical competition rather than a platform for cooperation. The erosion of climate governance merely reflects a broader crisis: the inability of multilateral institutions to assert themselves as guarantors of an international order increasingly shaped by competition and fragmentation. Without binding mechanisms, multilateralism risks becoming a diplomacy of intent, devoid of the capacity to govern systemic—and tangible—crises such as the climate emergency.
Stefania Petruzzelli, Ph.D., Independent Researcher, Consultant & Ghostwriter in Sustainability, Innovation & Geopolitics, Italy.