Recalibrating Asia’s Frontiers in a Contested Order
To navigate the dynamic international order, Asia will have to balance principles and pragmatism — until it no longer has to
C Raja Mohan’s recent piece in Foreign Affairs titled “The Multipolar Delusion and the Unilateral Temptation” underscores a central reality: polarity in the international order remains contested. This period of interregnum continues to make geopolitical flux its central feature. So, if anything, state actors will continue grappling with a crumbling world order — one where the survivors with grace will be best remembered and least resented.
The title of this piece takes after the theme of the 38th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, where discussions centred around how Asia can manage the complexities of a rapidly changing geopolitical order — marked by growing spheres of influence, the gradual irrelevance of multilateralism, and heightened antagonism in international politics. While the outcomes of the discussions generally contributed to an overall grim outlook, the key takeaways focused on the extent of pragmatism in regional engagement.
Do principles, norms, and values matter when push comes to shove? Recent events, particularly US President Donald Trump’s across-the-board tariffs, the return of American adventurism, the shaky foundations of transatlantic ideological alignment, skirmishes in Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent, and persistent unrest in West Asia do indeed bring to the fore the importance of balancing pragmatism and principles in foreign policy. This will shape Asia’s frontiers — geographically, structurally, and functionally.
When there is only a semblance of centrality, ASEAN will not truly be equipped to navigate the emerging and constantly re-emerging international order. Principles like non-interference can survive, surely, but with the pragmatism that comes from being non-indifferent to issues that remain an albatross.
From a Southeast Asian perspective, take, for example, ASEAN’s initial approach to the US tariffs last year. During Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship, the ASEAN Geoeconomics Task Force (AGTF) was set up to coordinate collective responses to the deteriorating economic environment. ASEAN economic ministers also met to denounce the so-called reciprocal tariffs and reaffirm their support for the rules-based multilateral trading system. This is based on shared principles, surely. The launch of AGTF showcased ASEAN unity, centrality, and mobilisation, in many ways also avoiding beggar-thy-neighbour policies. At a time when ASEAN’s agency is under question, this move reiterated ASEAN’s “cometh the hour, cometh the man” persona that the regional organisation has embraced in the last few years. However, it is also noteworthy that a number of ASEAN member states also finalised their own trade deals with the US. Pragmatism? Perhaps. But optics-wise, this points to a dangerous drift to a policy of appeasement — not always the best look for states seeking to project agency.
In the grand scheme of things, perhaps the balance between principles and pragmatism lies in how well a state actor compartmentalises its values versus its interests — its aspirations for a role in the emerging order and its limitations due to inherent dispositions. This is never easy, especially when expectations come from external forces. It would not be an exaggeration to say that ASEAN’s potent challenges with the Myanmar crisis and the South China Sea dispute have debilitated its mechanisms. Despite recent moves like the mainstreaming of its Indo-Pacific outlook or other efforts at deeper economic integration, these issues continue to weaken ASEAN unity and, by extension, ASEAN centrality. And when there is only a semblance of centrality, ASEAN will not truly be equipped to navigate the emerging and constantly re-emerging international order. Principles like non-interference can survive, surely, but with the pragmatism that comes from being non-indifferent to issues that remain an albatross.
In this context of Asia navigating the dynamic international order, there is no doubt that, for Southeast Asia, regionalism and intentional regionalisation remain paramount. Despite its shortcomings, ASEAN continues to be an anchor for engagement, both for its own member states and regional partners. ASEAN’s convening power, though scrutinised in recent years for the lack of tangible outcomes and perceived irrelevance, remains a consistent feature that still allows it to shape institutions and dynamics central to the regional architecture.
Based on its principles of mutually beneficial cooperation, ASEAN must be open to leading inter-regional engagement to better connect the Global South. Grounded in pragmatism, ASEAN must also ensure that it continues to play a bridging role between the Global South and the West.
It is through this lens that ASEAN must view the re-emergence of the Global South, both in terms of strategic narratives and conscious engagement. Based on its principles of mutually beneficial cooperation, ASEAN must be open to leading inter-regional engagement to better connect the Global South. Grounded in pragmatism, ASEAN must also ensure that it continues to play a bridging role between the Global South and the West, and vice versa, as it has through mechanisms like the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum — especially when sentiments borne out of Western disillusionment continue to dominate Global South discourse. Choosing not to engage with frameworks like BRICS or even the Quad is counterproductive, as it is akin to sitting on the sidelines while the regional architecture, especially at this juncture, shifts so rapidly.
The rise of Asia, while a noteworthy trend in evolving geopolitics, risks remaining just that — a trend. Unless there is active recalibration to shape these changes in the international order, based on an acute understanding of how to balance principles and pragmatism when addressing both rogue and status quo elements, Asia will remain a region “with only potential”. For ASEAN and Southeast Asia, appeasement politics is only as effective as the aggressor allows. There is little real value in extrinsic recalibration — policy change based solely on an external stressor. Rather, recalibration should be intrinsic — an intentional change in policy approaches or structural disposition driven by the desire to shape outcomes in the long run.
While principles and pragmatism must be weighed equally in this environment, so too must the existing tools that state actors already possess as sovereign states capable of multilateral and regional engagement.
Recalibrating Asia’s frontiers in a changing order must be as much a tangible exercise as it is a conscious one. While principles and pragmatism must be weighed equally in this environment, so too must the existing tools that state actors already possess as sovereign states capable of multilateral and regional engagement.
Whatever shape the international order takes in the next few years — whether unipolar, bipolar, multipolar, or even multiplex (borrowing from Amitav Acharya’s coinage of the term) — Asian resilience and survival will depend on the extent of internal capacity building. While the current obligation for engagement has involved balancing principles and pragmatism due to deep interdependencies, enhancing national and regional resilience to ensure the consistent delivery of public goods, regardless of global shocks and geopolitical uncertainties, will allow state actors to engage primarily through principle — and this should be the ultimate aspiration.
Yanitha Meena Louis is an Analyst at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia.